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Artificial Reproduction Technologies and Conflict of Laws:
An Initial Approach
Anastasia Grammaticaki-Aexiou"
I. INTRODUCTION

The turn ofthe century is witnessing many "revolutions" which are attributable
to the extremely rapid evolution of science and technology. The human brain,
having found the ideal servant in computers, is able to produce impressive results
in a much shorter time than ever before. One such "revolution" is the result of the
astonishing developments in reproductive technology which take place in
laboratories. It is no more an exaggeration to say that man has managed to direct
the evolution oflife. And while medicine and biotechnology are running at a high
speed, the law crawls on all fours, sweating and struggling to catch up. Due to this
scientific progress, new situations occur, and it is rather doubtful whether old legal
rules can successfully regulate certain problems that were unimaginable in the past.
A considerable volume of legal writing, mostly originating from the United
States, has been devoted to the legal issues raised by the progress ofbiotechnology
2
in the fields of assisted reproduction' and surrogate motherhood. Both represent
contemporary developments in family building that depart from the models
humanity has been experiencing through the ages. Their discussion usually covers
several branches ofsubstantive law, such as family law successions, constitutional
law, human rights, and criminal law. So far, extremely little attention has been paid
to the problems created by reproductive technologies in a world where the everyday
private life ofindividuals, due to their mobility, may be linked with more than one
jurisdiction. In other words, the issues related to the conflict of laws in this field
have been more or less neglected.' But the simple fact that laws treating such
matters differ from state to state or from country to country and that the presence
of foreign elements may prevent the courts from applying their domestic rules,
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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ArtificialReproductive Technologyand the Laws Which Govern That Technology,48 DePaul L. Rev.
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Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 Hastings L.J. 911 (1990); Roger J. Chin,
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Kathryn V. Lorio, From Cradleto Tomb: EstatePlanningConsiderationsofthe New Procreation,57
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GestationalSurrogateMotherhood,25 Ma. L J. 49 (1997); Susan F. Appleton, SurrogacyAgreements
and the Conflict ofLaws, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 399 (1990).

3.
note 2.

However, the analysis on conflicts problems and surrogate motherhood in Appleton, supra
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makes such a discussion necessary. The variety and novelty of the problems that
may occur render it fascinating.
This contribution is intended to serve as an incentive for further discussion. It
will examine only a few problems of the general theory of conflict of laws, as it is
understood in continental Europe, such as the incidental question, characterization,
mandatory rules and public policy, as they may be utilized in assisted reproduction
cases connected with more than one legal system. Actually, these problems are
harder and ofmore importance than those belonging to the special part of conflicts:
it is their solution, not always easy, that leads to the appropriate conflicts rule.
Once there, one will deal with the rules for contracts (e.g., in case of a surrogate
motherhood agreement), torts (e.g., in negligence for safekeeping frozen sperm or
embryos), family issues (e.g., disavowal by father of child born after artificial
insemination ofmother) or succession (e.g., capacity of posthumously reproduced
child to inherit). A brief outline of the usual methods of assisted reproductive
technology as well as of surrogate motherhood, which is often linked with it, is
necessary as a starting point.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Due to infertility, many people are unable to fulfill their desire to produce
offspring. Their growing numbers, combined with the solutions offered to them by
biotechnology, have caused a considerable growth in the assisted reproductive
technology market. More and more couples as well as single persons find the
answer to their prayers in medical laboratories. The usual methods involved are (a)
artificial insemination, (b) in vitro fertilization, often combined with
cryopreservationand (c) surrogatemotherhood.
Artificial inseminationis one of the oldest methods of assisted reproduction.
It is the method mimicking nature: a woman's ovum is fertilized by the artificial
delivery of semen in her vagina or uterus. The semen may be that ofher husband
(homologous, AIH) or that ofa donor (heterologous, AID), or a combination ofthe
two (AIC). It may also be fresh or frozen. To this technique, one must add the
gametes intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), where ova and sperm are placed together in
the fallopian tube for fertilization.4
In vitrofertilization (IVF) is the medical procedure which involves mixing
semen and ova in a test tube or petri dish. The preembryo that may be formed is
transferred to the woman's womb or fallopian tube (ZIFT) or is frozen and stored
to be implanted later. The gametes used may be those of the couple, but often either
the ova or the sperm or both may be donated by third persons.' Cryopreservation
is the process by which sperm or embryos are frozen and banked at very low
temperatures for future use. It is quite often the complementary element of
IVF.

4. Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: ProposedAmendments to the Uniform
Probate Code in LightofNew Reproductive Technology, 67 Temple L. Rev. 335, 337 (1996).

5. Seeidat337-38.
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To the above techniques one might add artificial procreation through cloning,
effected by (a) the artificial division of the fertilized egg to more viable parts, (b)
the removal of the nucleus from one embryo and the replacement of it with a
nucleus from another embryo or person or (c) the removal of a DNA sample from
a living or deceased person and its transplant into the nucleus of another egg or
embryo. This technique, however, has only been experimental so far and has not
been used for the creation ofhuman beings. However, Britain has already granted
a patent covering cloned early stage human embryos and the United States is
assessing the situation.
The technique of surrogate embryo transfer (SET) which involves the removal
of an embryo from a surrogate by uterine lavage and implantation in another
woman's uterus should also be mentioned. It resembles the donation ofova, except
that the egg is first fertilized in the donor's body, usually by artificial
insemination.
A much debated way for a woman who cannot or does not want to gestate to
become a mother is surrogatemotherhood. Another woman offers to gestate the
embryo produced either by IVF of the woman's egg using her husband's or a
donor's sperm, or by artificial insemination. Sometimes the surrogate mother's
motives may be clearly altruistic, as it happens between relatives, but the usual case
involves paid surrogate motherhood.'
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
Inevitably these techniques touch upon the delicate matters of human
reproduction, human rights, personal relations, famil, property and successions.
Each state or country may regulate such matters in a different way,7 adopting
a restrictive or hospitable attitude, or choose not to regulate them at all. The
issues which may be raised belong to several areas of private and public law.
The technique which is less expected to give rise to problems is artificial
insemination with fresh sperm. If the husband's sperm is used, medicine is only
assisting by imitating nature and no more disputes can occur than those in regular
fertilization, with the exception of tort claims for negligence on the part of the
doctor or hospital. Theoretically, if adonor's sperm is used, a paternity claimmight
follow. But usually the donor is unknown and such claims are rare.
However, if the sperm is frozen several things may happen:
(a) The husband who has provided the sperm dies. His widow
wants to be inseminated posthumously. Should a dead man become
a father?
6. Anita Stuhmkcke,ForLove orforMoney: The Legal Regulation ofSurrogate Motherhood,
Murdoch U. Electronic J.L., Vol. 3,No. 1(1996); Expecting Trouble Surrogacy, Fetal Abuse, and
New Reproductive Technologies (ed. P.Boling, 1995).
7. See, e.g, Frederique Dreifuss-Netter et al., Adoption and Medically Assisted Procreation
UnderFrench Law, 1996 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J.93, or the English "Human Fertilization
and Embryology Act 1990."
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(b) The man dies and his last will contains a clause according to which his
girlfriend is entitled to the frozen sperm if she wants to bear a posthumous
child. Can the sperm be inherited?
(c) The sperm bank where a man has deposited his sperm to be kept frozen
before he undergoes therapy which will leave him infertile destroys the
sperm by negligence. Will the man, his wife, or both have a tort claim?
(d) A woman or her child seeks support from the man who has donated
genetic material.
In IVF, where a considerable part of the process-including the critical point
of fertilization-takes place outside the woman's body, various scenarios may
appear:
(a) The married couple for its own reasons has the embryo frozen for
future use. Soon thereafter they decide to divorce. They both want the
embryo. Who has a stronger claim?
(b) If the father dies before the gestation and birth of the child, can the
embryo inherit his property?
(c) Can the couple decide to abandon the embryo in the clinic where it has
been kept frozen?
(d) Can the couple decide to donate or sell the embryo?
(e) If a donor's sperm fertilizes a donor's egg and the resulting embryo is
implanted in another woman, will she be recognized as the mother ofthe
child although she has not contributed any genetic material? Or, if the
child dies in such a case, can the parents who did not provide any genetic
material inherit?
(f) As the procedure is quite difficult, expensive and exhausting for the
woman, doctors usually have more than one egg fertilized and some ofthe
resulting embryos which will not be used may be cryopreserved in case
they are needed later. If the parents are not interested in having other
children, who decides the fate of the embryos?
In surrogate motherhood the issues vary:
(a) If the surrogate mother decides she wants to keep the baby, can the
couple who made the surrogate agreement with her take the child?
(b) Vice versa, if the couple that was expecting to take the baby changes
its mind and does not want it anymore, can the surrogate mother force
them to take it?
(c) Is the surrogacy agreement sufficient to make the couple parents ofthe
baby, or is it necessary to adopt the child?
(d) Can a child claim support from the surrogate mother?
(e) Can the couple assert a cause of action in case of wrongful death of the
embryo if the surrogate mother decides to have an abortion? If the latter
smokes, drinks, or takes drugs during pregnancy and the baby is born
deformed or retarded, can the couple have a claim in tort against her?
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(f) If a surrogate mother abducts the baby and takes it to another country
to avoid the demands ofthe biological parents, is it an international child
abduction within the scope of the relevant Hague Convention?
Ofcourse, this enumeration of cases is not exhaustive, but it is enough to show
the variety of legal issues a lawyer or a judge may be confronted with. All ofthem
may be much more complicated if foreign elements are present, such as different
domiciles, habitual residences, nationalities, different places where important steps
are taken, place ofthe tort in another jurisdiction or foreign applicable law chosen
by the parties. For example, in country A (the genetic mother's home), the
gestational mother in a surrogacy agreement might be considered the legal mother,
while in country B (the gestational mother's domicile) she might not. When this
happens, conflict of laws has to provide solutions concerning jurisdiction, the
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
As in all conflicts cases when the applicable law has to be indicated, the first
step consists of characterizing the issue.8 In most of the above hypotheticals the
basic issue and its characterization depend on the previous answer to an
incidental/preliminary question.9 For example, if the main problem is whether the
frozen embryo of an English couple domiciled in England, which is banked in
Belgium may inherit from its biological father and under what law, it is necessary
to begin by examining the legal status of the embryo. Is it a human being,'" a thing,
or something else?" Can it have rights? Which law will determine whether it has
capacity to inherit? Will the lex successionis apply to the incidental question as
well?
Actually the status of the embryo is an incidental question of great importance
in many main issues arising from artificial procreation, such as its capacity to inherit
or be inherited, property matters or torts. Another significant incidental question
is whether the provider of genetic material, or the woman who gestates an embryo
without being biologically related to it, is the legal parent of a child in cases where
the main question is custody, support or inheritance. The same applies to the issue
of whether in surrogate motherhood situations the social parents are, for the same
purposes, the legal parents of the child. Last but not least, the legal relationship of

8. Frangois Rigaux, La th6orie des qualifications en droit international priv6, (1956); Arthur H.
Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, (1940).
9. T. S.Schmidt, The Incidental Question in Private International Law, 305 (Recueil des Cours
1992 II). For incidents ofstatus and the incidental question, see Symeon C. Symeonides et al., Conflict
of Laws: American, Comparative, International 429 (1998).
10. Louisiana isthe only state which protects the in vitro fertilized ovum as a "juridical person"
with a separate legal identity and certain rights. See La. R.S. 9:124-27, 129 (1998).
11. For an extensive discussion on the various views, see Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes
Surrounding Human Reproductive Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts,

1998 Seton Hall Legis. J. 103, 134 (1998); Brenda McGivem, Bioethics and the Law: The Impact of
the Genetic Technologyon Prenatal Management, E Law, Murdoch U. Electronic J.L., Vol. 2, No. 3,
Dec. 1995); Jean-Christophe Galloux, Le statut des gametes humains en droitfranfais contemporain,
1995 McGill L.J. 993, 1000. See also York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421,422 (E.D.Va. 1989), Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), and Kass v. Kass, 235 A.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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the child with its biological parents may be the incidental question of importance
to the main issue of adoption of the child by them.
Traditionally, American conflicts writers are not particularly eager to
discuss topics related to the general part of the field. Continental private
international law theory has dealt extensively with the problem of the
incidental question, but this does not apply to legislation or case law.
Actually there is very little case law internationally to offer adequate
guidance.
The proposed solutions vary. According to one opinion, the law applicable to
the incidental question will be the appropriate conflicts rule of the forum.' 2
According to another opinion, the same law which will be applied for the main issue
will also govern the incidental question.' 3 There is an intermediate view according
to which the forum will select one or the other solution as it thinks fit for each
individual case."'
The first opinion emphasizes that since ex hypothesithe incidental question is
capable ofarising in its own right or in other contexts than the one before the court
and has conflicts rules ofits own available for its determination, the court, should
it apply a foreign conflict rule, might reach a decision contrary to its own
conceptions ofjustice. The decision might also be different from what the court
would have decided if the question had been presented to it in another form and not
incidentally.
The second opinion leads to the application of the same law for both the
main and the preliminary issue. It seems practical and efficient. But it is
probably the third opinion which offers the most flexible answers by letting
the court decide in each individual case the solution that serves its interests
best.
When the incidental question concerns the legal status of the embryo, i.e. an
issue which has been strongly debated, flexibility may lead tojust results, although
it is almost inevitably accompanied by legal uncertainty.
Characterization is a process which is present in the application of any
legal rule. Fitting a factual situation into the appropriate rule of law requires its
dressing with the appropriate legal garment, thus giving it its legal character. In
conflict oflaws the applicable law depends on the characterization ofthe issue. The
latter is more complicated than characterization in domestic cases and thus, more
difficult. In cases without foreign elements domestic law characterizes the issue,
while in conflicts cases more laws are involved and, consequently, it has to be
decided which one of them will be used for the characterization. The main
possibilities offered are (a) the substantive law of the forum, 5 (b) the law
12. Walter Breslauer, The Private International Law of Succession in England, America and
Germany 18 (1937).
13. See Robertson, supra note 8 at 566, 568. See also Schwebel v. Ungar, (1963) 42 D.L.R. 2d
622 (1964) 48 D.L.R.2d 644, Baindail v. Baindail, 122, 127 (1946).
14. A. E. Gotlieb, 7he Incidental Question in Anglo-American Conflict ofLaws, 1955 Can. Bar.
Rev. 523.
15. John H. Morris etal, The Conflict of Laws 418 (1993).
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as applicable by the forum's conflicts rules"6 or (c) a combination of
designated
7
both.1
Characterization lege causaeis not usually preferred; on the other hand, the
prevailing method of characterizing a factual situation lege fori may not be a
satisfactory solution in cases as the ones mentioned above, where very important
issues related to the person and the family are at stake and the law, with which the
situation is otherwise connected, might object to the outcome ofthe case due to its
characterization. For example, in a surrogacy case, if the forum accepts the
surrogacy agreement as creating the bonds of parentage, while the law of the
country of the habitual residence of the family so created requires an adoption
decree for the establishment of parentage, the child will be a stranger to the couple
in the country where they live. Thus it is preferable to resort to a comparative
characterization, i.e. to characterize the issue according to the lexfori but taking
into consideration the characterizations provided by the other systems involved.'"
In artificial reproduction, issues of characterization may prove quite complicated
and such a flexible approach seems more appropriate.
In all instances, however, when the choice of the applicable law in incidental
questions or in the characterization of the issues affects the life of a child, it is
preferable to allow the court to exercise its discretion in each individual case and
to adopt flexible approaches, which usually serve better the interests of the child.
This last criterion.has been recognized as playing an important role in all family
matters, domestic or international. 9 Also, it has to be remembered that quite often
characterization has been used as an escape device, in order to reach satisfactory
solutions by subjecting the facts of the case to a different conflicts rule.
IV. THE ROLE OF MANDATORY RULES OF THE FORUM AND OF PUBUC POLICY
Artificial procreation is a matter which belongs to the sphere of private
interests. Accordingly, the forum in a relevant conflicts case will proceed as with
all other private international law cases, first characterizing the issues as described,
then finding the appropriate conflicts rule and, finally, applying the law, domestic
or foreign, that has been indicated. Nevertheless, sometimes the great importance
of some issues to the legal order of the forum sets aside the familiar conflicts
process and requires their direct subjection to mandatory rules of the forum.
This may be better described by an example: A man, father of two children,
domiciled in country A, has his sperm cryopreserved in country B before he
undergoes a major operation. Soon after the operation he dies. In his will there is
a clause allowing his girlfriend to be artificially inseminated with that sperm in
0
country B, if she wishes to have a child from him." The clinic refuses to perform
16.

Re Maldonado, at 223, 348-49 (1954).

17.
18.

See Morris, supranote 15, at 420.
Earnest Rabel, Das Problem der Qualifikation, RabelsZ 1929, p.254.

19. See, e.g., R.Walton, The Best Interests of the Child, 1976 B.J.S.W. 307.
20. Facts are similar to aCalifornia case, Hecht v.Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993),

which, however, did not contain foreign elements, as well as a Louisiana case, Hallv.Fertility institute
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the insemination or give the girlfriend the sperm and she files a lawsuit in country
B. The presence of foreign elements leads the court to the setting ofthe conflictual
mechanism in motion. However country B has a strong policy against posthumous
conception, considering it immoral and unethical. In fact it has passed a law
prohibiting such a practice. Even if the court finds that the law of country A
applies, and that the latter does not oppose posthumous conception, there is such a
strong interest against the practice in its country that it will respect the prohibition
provided by its own law"' and will not consider at all its conflicts rules.22
The same result may be achieved by the public policy exception, if the court
finds that the results produced by the application of the foreign law will violate its
domestic sense of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals and deep
rooted traditions that consider procreation an act reserved for people who are
alive.23 However the exception is the last resort, an after thought in the conflictual
process. The basic difference between the invocation of a mandatory rule, not
permitting the application of any other rule, domestic or foreign, and the public
policy exception is that by the former system the protection of the forum's order is
more effective and the relevant policy is manifested from the very beginning, while
the latter intervenes only after the applicable law has been indicated and only ifthe
court decides that its application will produce undesirable results.
Surrogate motherhood may also set in motion such protective mechanisms. As
many legal systems oppose it, their courts will either resort to their own mandatory
rules prohibiting the practice, if such rules exist, or find it contrary to their public
policy.24 Even if the parties in the surrogate agreement have chosen a permissive
applicable law and notwithstanding the principle of respecting party autonomy in
contracts, either a mandatory rule of the forum-if such a rule exists-or the
intervention ofpublic policy will bar the application of that law. A similar attitude
may be expected as far as cloned human embryos are concerned.
One cannot conclude these observations without mentioning the role of forum
shopping when some jurisdictions show an open-mindedness toward issues
generated by artificial procreation and others adopt a negative attitude. Whenever
permitted by the rules on jurisdiction, the interested parties may attempt to evade

of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994). See also the French case Parpalaix v.
CECOS, Tri.Gr. Inst. Creteil, 1984, Gazette du Palais 1984, 11.
21. See L. C.Nolan, Posthumous Conception: APrivate orPublic Matter? 1997 BYU J.Pub.

LI.
22. Phoncion Francescakis, Quelques precisions sur les "lois d'application imm6diate etleurs
rapports avec les r~gles de conflits de lois, Rev. Crit. 1966.1.
23. For adiscussion on posthumous procreation see Anne R.Schiff, Arising from the Dead:
Challenges ofPosthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 901 (1997). In the English case R.v. Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, (1997) 2All E.R. 687, a woman was not

allowed to conceive using her dead husband's sperm because there was no written consent of the
deceased. However E.C. law allowed her to be treated inBelgium with her husband's sperm unless
there were good public policy reasons for not allowing this to happen.

24.

Ausual argument isthe refusal to treat the woman as acontainer or commodity. See also

the public policy issue raised by the Louisiana law, La.R.S. 9:121-123 (1991), prohibiting the sale of
human embryos, or that ofposthumous conception.
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the laws of the competent legal system by initiating proceedings before the courts
of the permissive states/countries. But it must be remembered that, especially in
international and not interstate conflicts, where clauses like full faith and credit are
not applicable, a judgment rendered in another jurisdiction may not be recognized
on grounds ofpublic policy.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion has attempted to indicate some of the points ofconcern
for the conflicts lawyer as regards the issues of artificial procreation. There is no
doubt that there are many more and that they may multiply as biotechnology
advances and each legal system adopts a different approach to the problems created.
The varying levels ofmedical standards and achievements from country to country
will generate another form of "medical tourism," thus giving rise to the conflicts
issues. It would be desirable to have all such issues resolved internationally through
uniform rules," but the prospect of such a wide consensus is still remote.

25.

An example of international efforts in this field is the Council of Europe's Bioethics

Convention, signed in April 1997. See Eibe Riedel, Global Responsibilities and Bioethics Reflections
on the Council ofEurope's Bioethics Convention, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 179 (1997).

